

~~SECRET~~

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: JUL 2007

CS Historical Paper
No. 52

EO 12958 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs
EO 12958 3.3(b)(6)>25Yrs
(S)

CLANDESTINE SERVICES HISTORY

| | |
|-------------------------|--|
| (TITLE OF PAPER) | |
| THE SECRET WAR IN KOREA | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| (PERIOD) | |
| June 1950 to June 1952 | |

DO NOT DESTROY

Date published: 17 July 1968

Copy No. 2 of 3

Controlled by : FE Division

Date prepared : March 1964

Written by : -

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

access to North Korea in the last year of the war.

Air Operations

For the first ten months of the war, CIA used U.S. Far East Air Force (FEAF) aircraft to drop agents and materiel into North Korea. CIA first began dropping agents in the twelfth week of the war. A detachment of the 21st Troop Carrier Squadron eventually redesignated as Flight "B" of the Fifth Air Force provided most of the support. FEAF also provided photo intelligence support to Agency operations.

U.S. Army unconventional warfare air operations began when an airborne ranger first lieutenant with the Theater Intelligence Liaison Group in Korea asked an Air Force captain to drop some G-2 (Army Intelligence) agents into North Korea. That flight was the genesis of Flight "B" which made hundreds of C-47 night flights over North Korea in the first two years of the war. Despite frequent adverse weather conditions and fog in the valleys, there were a minimum of abortive flights. The Flight "B" aircrews always did a fine job and with no loss of aircraft. One pilot made more than 108 night flights over North Korea, dropping agents, propaganda leaflets, and supplies.

When the enemy retaliated against CIA guerrillas in the winter of 1951-1952, drop zones and drop times had to be laid on and changed on short notice. Simultaneously the Air Force

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

increased its air support to the more vital conventional warfare making aircraft difficult to get. A civilian Cessna and a Beechcraft C-45 were obtained by the Agency. Two of the best pilots were transferred to CIA from Flight "B". Cargo aircraft from a CIA-controlled civilian airline were used to support the guerrilla forces. The U.S. Air Force-CIA relationship throughout the war was particularly profitable, close, and cordial.

Eighth United States Army Korea (EUSAK) Guerrillas

In early 1951, CIA and the G-3 Eighth United States Army Korea (EUSAK), working in harmony, divided North Korea into two parts for guerrilla warfare action and control.

The Agency already had established the nucleus for a trained guerrilla movement in the mountains in the extreme northeast. The Army took the western portion where a spontaneous pro-U.N. guerrilla movement developed after the U.N. offensive crossed the 38th parallel on 7 October 1950.

By October 1951 the G-3 EUSAK program had about 8,000 guerrillas on the west coast above the 38th parallel organized into sixteen units of varying capabilities depending on how they were recruited and their state of training. However, no safe bases were established on the flat, muddy mainland estuaries and indentations as the effort was dependent upon island bases lying off the west coast, protected by the

~~SECRET~~

U.S. Navy which controlled the sea. This failure to establish secure bases on the coastal mainland was disastrous. During the Panmunjom Truce Talks in the winter of 1951-1952, the Communists mopped up the area. [] CIA advisors worked with the EUSAK west coast guerrillas from January to April 1952. Competition between the CIA and Army guerrilla warfare efforts was keen but wholesome, with no real problems at the operating level. The over-all CIA/Army relationship at that level was eminently satisfactory and mutually advantageous.

FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE (FI)

In the early stages of the war, there was confusion in the field of intelligence collection. Military units were not prepared for the Communist invasion and, consequently, had no plans for collecting tactical intelligence in the event of war. Budgets had been slashed, and trained personnel were not available. General Willoughby, G-2 of the Far East Command, asked CIA to step into this tactical intelligence gap from which there was no pulling out until the war was terminated.

An Early Air Infiltration

One of the first missions assigned to the Agency was the placement of [] teams in [] separate areas along the northern border of North Korea. The objectives were to

~~SECRET~~

establish observation posts in mountainous areas overlooking railroad lines, ports, and major highways used by the North Korean Army, and to give early warning of support by Chinese Communists or Soviets. After ten weeks of training [] teams were dropped close to their target areas from a Far East Air Force B-17. [] of the [] teams came on the air with their radios, but within four days reported that they were detected and on the run. Of the [] men dropped over a period of ten months, [] were returned to CIA after working their way back to U.S. Army or U.S. Marine Divisions. The operation demonstrated that properly motivated and trained Korean agents could survive in the North and produce results if they could be put in place without being detected.

Support to Inchon Landings

In early August 1950 at the time of the Pusan Perimeter, Colonel William Quinn, ^{6/} who had served with the Central Intelligence Group, was a member of the Task Force then preparing to land at Inchon on 15 September 1950. Colonel Quinn and the OSO (CIA Intelligence) Chief [] planned the placing of [] CIA case officers on an island off Inchon harbor to collect pre-invasion intelligence. The case officers used a simple control technique. []

[]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]

The intelligence produced supported General MacArthur's decision to proceed with the Inchon Landings despite active opposition of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Thus, CIA made a small contribution to the most brilliant tactical stroke of the Korean War.

Armed Reconnaissance of North Korean Coast

In the late summer of 1950, an armed CIA-Korean reconnaissance team began making regular night landings on the enemy east coast. The team operating from a U.S. destroyer took Brigadier General Crawford F. Sams, the Surgeon General of the Far East Command, into an enemy fishing village at night; outpost the area, made contact with the village chiefs, and returned the Surgeon General to the destroyer. The General's foray into the village was to counter Communist claims that the U.S. was engaged in germ warfare and earned General Sams the Distinguished Service Cross for his part in the night's operations.

~~SECRET~~

Arms and Munitions: In 1951, enemy weapons and ammunition were issued to CIA guerrillas from a captured weapons dump near Pusan. CIA armed guerrillas with light U.S. infantry weapons: M-1 rifles, tommyguns, carbines, BARs, .30 caliber light machine guns, 2.36 rocket launchers (bazookas) and no weapon heavier than the 81 mm mortar.

Support - A Two-Way Street: Sensible two-way support arrangements evolved through necessity and cooperation.

In the tenth week of the war, CIA was given [] parachutes by the Far East Air Force to drop [] agent teams along the Manchurian-Soviet border of North Korea. In 1951 agents of the Army Far East Command Liaison Group were dropped with CIA parachutes when all military airborne materiel in the theater was frozen for use by the 187th Parachute Infantry. No reimbursement was required in either case. The unconventional warfare operators were "poor relations" compared to the conventional forces; consequently, they helped each other in every way they could.

The predecessor to the present CIA roller conveyor air cargo drop system was developed by an Air Force officer assigned to the Agency Mission in Korea. Concerned with the time delays civilian parachute dispatch officers took to get cargo out over the drop zone, he borrowed some roller conveyor rails from an Air Force storage warehouse and made an

~~SECRET~~

effective and faster exit mechanism. CIA provided small gold bars [redacted] to the Far East Air Force (FEAF) for Escape and Evasion kits. CIA declined as unnecessary a FEAF reimbursement offer. U.S. radios of that day were too bulky and heavy for guerrilla warfare. CIA contacted the [redacted] electronics industry and had a smaller, lighter radio placed in production. Sets were given to the Armed Forces for their agent operations.

Agent Authentication

A major problem was that of trying to keep up with North Korean changes in document control. [redacted]

[redacted] In North Korea,

CIA and military agents collected travel control, identity, and ration documents which were then sent [redacted] for reproduction. Another major source for authentication material was the Advanced Allied Translator and Interpreter Section in Korea.

Finances

The Mission finance officer from November 1951 to July 1952, recalls that the Agency was funded in cash in an amount of approximately [redacted] U.S. dollars per month or [redacted] annually. With few exceptions, funds were converted to Korean currency ("won") through an Army Disbursing

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

authority to do whatever was necessary to see that the covert and clandestine activities of all American units in Korea were coordinated. [redacted] in November 1951 after exploratory discussions with the Acting CIA Representative, FEC, G-2 EUSAK, other CIA officers in [redacted] Korea, the Far East Air Force and the 7th Fleet, the Theater G-2 section arbitrarily acted to achieve G-2's stated and intended purposes. G-2 clearly understood General Walter Bedell Smith's position that CIA being placed under the Far East Theater Commander was predicated on Army assurance it would turn back clandestine and covert activities to the Agency as soon as combat ceased. "Peace talks" were resumed at Panmunjom on 27 November 1951 and the "cease fire" line was agreed upon. For the first time since the war began it appeared that an end to the fighting was in sight. On 28 November 1951 a FECOM order created a new organization by giving FEC/LD the euphonious short title: CCRAK.

FEC/LD, the Theater G-2 detachment in Korea, responded by placing a sign in ten-inch letters in front of their office in Seoul announcing FEC/LD was the American Headquarters for "COVERT, CLANDESTINE, AND RELATED ACTIVITIES, KOREA."
19/ Astounded CIA staffers in Korea appreciating the humor of the situation, helped their old friend the FEC/LD Commander, now the new Commander CCRAK, to improvise the euphemistic

~~SECRET~~

title "Combined Command Reconnaissance Activities Korea." With the issuance of the 28 November FECOM order, the Chief, CIA Mission Korea became Deputy Commander of CCRAK in addition to his CIA duties. CIA personnel in Korea pitched in and tried to make CCRAK work as they were much too busy with operations to have the time or inclination to fight the command problem. With MacArthur's G-2 gone, the CIA Chiefs

[redacted] while skeptically remembering that not long ago General Willoughby put CIA activities under surveillance [redacted]

[redacted] cautiously agreed not to fight "city hall."

The Effect of CCRAK

On 6 March 1952 the Acting Senior CIA Representative [redacted] reviewed CCRAK activities for CIA Headquarters. The dispatch attached, described what it terms a shocking desire for control -- theater staff officers' attempts to circumvent the Acting Senior CIA Representative/FEC at theater level and unwarranted attempts to gain operational information not needed by a non-operating agency. The dispatch also said CIA officers in Korea held the firm belief that General Ridgway, the FE Commander; General Van Fleet, Commander EUSAK; General Everest, FEAF Commander; and Admiral Martin, Commanding the 7th Fleet, were all of the opinion that CIA could best render support to the Theater Commander by attempting to carry out its own national missions rather than by becoming a

~~SECRET~~

low-level tactical organization. The long and detailed dispatch is of special interest in the light of present day CIA relations with the JCS/Special Assistant for Counter-insurgency and Special Activities (JCS/SACSA), the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and the increasing involvement of CIA in joint covert activities with the Armed Forces.

The effect of CCRAK's creation was stronger G-2 control over CIA, weighting the Agency with demands for direct tactical support of G-2, thereby proliferating CIA's long-term strategic responsibilities with local low-level order-of-battle type tasks. These tasks inevitably diverted the small CIA Mission from its primary job of getting high-level strategic information

[redacted] and from making a concentrated effort to establish viable covert action cells in [redacted]

[redacted] North Korea. The diversion of long-range assets to tactical operations exposed agents and operations not only to the enemy but to the local population and to many United Nations agencies as well.

The centralized coordinating mechanism adopted in Korea was ill advised. As the Agency on-duty strength increased after June 1951, more man-hours were devoted to lateral liaison than had been previously possible. When CCRAK was formalized in November 1951, CIA had good working relations

~~SECRET~~

with all the senior U.S. military commanders in Korea. Liaison was also maintained with their subordinate units where there was a need for mutual cooperation, support, or special services. Most important, a feeling of mutual trust and understanding had grown up among the individuals of the various subordinate units engaged in clandestine and covert operations in Korea.

Additionally, the CCRAK organization with unquestioned over-control of CIA activities as of June 1952 still had not unraveled the more vexing problem of coordinating agent activities. There were the problems of false confirmation of reports caused by lateral contacts between Korean agents, of fabricators, and of double agents. Penetrations of U.S. and foreign intelligence services did not get the prompt damage assessments required to bring them quickly under control. In fairness to CCRAK officers, the CIA Mission Korea admittedly complicated the agent coordinating issue by refusing to reveal identities of sensitive agents. This was done because CIA is required by law to protect its sources, and the Korean Mission had been directed by its Washington Headquarters to preserve its assets for the long haul regardless of the outcome of the war.

The lack of coordination of agent activities was most noticeable in the U.S. counterintelligence effort against the

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

mammoth Communist covert action machine. Yet, G-2 EUSAK would not permit the Eighth Army Counterintelligence Corps to be placed under joint CCRAK coordination. Clearly, CCRAK was sauce to cook the CIA goose. It was not intended that the job should be divided up with the Armed Forces to launch a combined counterintelligence offensive.

It is fruitless to speculate on what might have been, but a regrettable side effect of the control exercised by CCRAK is that the Agency did not put its best foot forward in Korea in the last year of the war. Quite frankly, with the exception of a hard core cadre, green and untried case officers were substituted for qualified, experienced officers because the latter were in short supply. By the fall of 1951, CIA Headquarters recognized there were great opportunities if more experienced CIA officers were in Korea. Accordingly, three of the most competent senior clandestine services officers in the Agency were selected: one to be full-time CIA representative and Deputy of CCRAK, another as head of CCRAK's counterintelligence section and doubling as Chief of CIA's counterespionage staff, and the third as Chief of foreign intelligence activities. When it became clear the CCRAK coordination meant that the cease-fire restrictions on tactical activities of the regular forces would also apply to strategic, covert, and clandestine operations, the three

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

officers were reassigned elsewhere.

In 1952 CCRAK began to stifle new operations. Consequently, CIA lost the covert action initiative in Korea to the Communists. The earlier CIA concept of an aggressive clandestine offensive, or at least covert counter-attack to the north, never materialized. By June 1952 the handwriting on the wall clearly pointed a return to a defensive covert and clandestine position.

So ends our memoirs of a limited war which caused more than four million casualties. The armistice talks bogged down over the POW issue. Men continued to die, but it became more a war of words than of guns. Stalemate fighting along the 38th parallel battlefield ended a year later with the Panmunjom cease-fire on 27 July 1953. At great price communism was contained, over twenty million souls remained free, and the world gained time and experience. Is the time well used by the West? What did the experience teach?

TAB B

AIR

6 March 1952

Chief, FE

Operational
Review of Combined Command Reconnaissance
Activities, Korea (CCRAK)*

Reference: WASH FG 29386

I. STATUS OF THE CIA MISSION KOREA, OCTOBER 1951

A. Mission

1. In October 1951 the mission of the CIA Mission Korea had been defined by Washington as the implementation of NSC Directive 5 and NSC Directive 10/2 in Korea, [redacted]

The CIA Mission Korea was also directed to support 8th Army, Korea 5th Air Force, and 7th U. S. Fleet Navy. The CIA Mission Korea was a joint Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) - Office of Special Operations(OSO) Mission and was assigned personnel from both offices.

2. There were in the CIA Mission Korea files many National Intelligence Directives and Guides, as well as numerous Essential Elements of Information. In existence was the beginning of a good effort in Guerrilla Warfare in Northeast Korea and a splendid black Psychological Warfare Program effected in cooperation with G-3 Psywar, EUSAK. An Evasion and Escape Program was being carried out on an advisory basis with the 8086th Army Unit, G-3 Section, EUSAK. North Korea had been divided into two parts for purposes of Guerrilla Warfare concentration: OPC having the eastern portion, and the 8086th Army Unit having the western portion. There was no geographical division established for psychological warfare. At that time the CIA Mission Korea did not have a program in political, resistance, or economic warfare.

3. In October 1951 the staff of the CIA Mission Korea was busily engaged and planning for a possible post-armistice in which, it was believed, the CIA Mission Korea

*CCRAK - Combined Command for Reconnaissance Activity Korea: Cover name for FEC/Unconventional Warfare Coordination Office in Korea.

would bear sole responsibility for the accomplishment of covert and clandestine missions in North Korea. The tentative plan for a resistance program in North Korea had been made, and annexes to that plan covering psychological, economic, guerrilla, and resistance warfare were being prepared.

4. A long-range plan was being prepared for the accomplishment of our National Intelligence mission in the areas of Mission responsibility. In October 1951, the penetration of North Korean Communist Party, Army, M.S.S., (The MGB of North Korea) and governmental offices was well under way. A good groundwork had been laid for the receipt of high-level information from all of those offices, as is shown by the subsequent record achieved by those nets during the months of November, December and January. (For instance, intelligence production of the CIA Mission Korea increased by 1/3 during December over the production of the previous month, and the record for January was almost equally significant. Forty percent of that production was military intelligence in direct support of the Armed Forces of the United States in Korea, the remaining sixty percent being divided between political, economic, social, and counterespionage reporting of a more long-range nature. In January, two specific reports covering the entire Order of Battle of the NK and CCF armies in North Korea were received.)

5. On the OPC side, contacts with the ROK Army and with a militant Buddhist organization had been made and tentative plans were in process for the use of those organizations in a vigorous resistance and guerrilla program.

6. Other intelligence organizations operating in Korea: FEC/LD; Special Activities Unit, 5th Air Force; ROK HID were operating low-level line crossing nets giving descriptive coverage of activities on the ground. Almost 100 percent of their reports were of the low-level type, the major exception being the reporting of the EUSAK CIC which interestingly enough has been excepted from the control of CCRAK. The guerrilla warfare program of G-3 EUSAK included about 8,000 guerrillas on the west coast, but no safe base had been established on the mainland of North Korea, and that effort was almost entirely dependent upon island bases lying off the west coast. This fact later proved disastrous.

7. Covert and clandestine activities in Korea were coordinated in October 1951 by FEC/LD, which enjoyed a full privilege of doing whatever the situation required to see that these activities were coordinated.

B. Organization of Covert and Clandestine Activities in Korea during October 1951

1. These activities, as before stated, were under the coordination of Col. Russell, Commanding Officer, FEC/LD, who was under the command of Col. Blakeney, Commanding Officer, FEC/LG, G-2 Section, GHQ. In addition to the units mentioned above, United States Army CIC Units were operating in Korea, both in the field of Counterintelligence and in the gathering of Positive Intelligence. The ROK Navy was engaged in the collection of positive information under the supervision of Commander Lousey, USN.

2. Fifth Air Force requirements were being met by the Special Activities Unit under Mr. Donald Nicholls.

3. The tactical OB requirements of EUSAK were being met by several units under the command of FEC/LD and by the ROK HID. The CIA Mission Korea was attempting to accomplish both its national requirements and its requirements in support of armed forces in Korea. (For instance, during the month of January 1952 the CIA Mission Korea furnished more reports in support of 5th Air Force than did any other organization in Korea.)

II. INTRODUCTION OF CCRAK PROPOSALS DURING OCTOBER 1951

A. Background

1. During the summer 1951, agreement was reached between Walter Bedell Smith and officers within the Department of the Army to place both covert and clandestine activities under CinCCE while actual combat continued in Korea. No agreement was reached concerning the way CinCCE would exercise that command authority.

2. On 18 October 1951, a draft paper was prepared within G-2 Section, GHQ, subject: Organization of Covert, Clandestine and Related Activities in the Far East Command. (See Annex No. 3) This paper suggested an organization called CCRAFEC, which would command these activities throughout the Far East Command, including Korea. It was arrived at after discussions among Central Intelligence Agency, G-2, GHQ and G-2, EUSAK officers. Upon its receipt a study dated 21 October 1951 was made by the staff of the CIA Mission Korea. (See Annex No. 2) A meeting was called in Seoul, Korea, to discuss that draft paper on 21 and 22 October 1951. Also, on 21 October 1951, the Central Intelligence Agency national position on this paper was sent [redacted] from WASH-AH. (See Annex No 4) A complete report of the Seoul conferences was prepared and submitted to Washington. (See Annex No. 6)

~~SECRET~~

3. The Washington position, Central Intelligence Agency, rests upon the following - Paragraph 2 of WASH 12391 states:

"Assumed that Far East Command proposal is in part outgrowth and within the framework of reference of General Willard G. Wyman series of conferences with Lt. Gen. Hickey, Chief of Staff, FEC, and others, and is intended to facilitate transfer of total responsibility for covert, clandestine and related activities to Central Intelligence Agency at early date. Guidance which follows hereinafter based this premise. At this instant we must depend for protection Central Intelligence Agency interest upon your assurance of continued validity this assumption."

This basic premise was included in the final paper of the Seoul conferences as initialed by G-2 EUSAK, [redacted] and Colonel Blakeney for G-2, GHQ.

4. In addition to including that basic premise, the Seoul conferees also initialed the following points made in WASH 12391:

a. The organizational integrity of Army, Air, Navy, and CIA units shall be maintained.

b. Army, Air, Navy, CIA units shall all be placed simultaneously under CCRAK.

c. CIA channel is [redacted] to the CIA Mission Korea. CIA operations of high sensitivity and/or with long-term characteristics which extend through area into adjacent areas and are not in direct support of EUSAK, shall be excepted from CCRAK control.

d. CCRAK is a joint staff under one command.

5. The Washington position was maintained and agreed to by G-2 representatives.

6. Fifth Air Force was informed of the Seoul conference paper and from that time on exchanged freely copies of its attitude on this subject with CIA officers. Lt. Gen. Everest

[redacted]

[redacted]

took the position in several messages to Gen. Weyland that the only organization capable of accomplishing the American clandestine and covert mission was CIA, and that all other units in Korea should be placed under it.

7. However, Lt. Gen. Everest was not approached on this subject by G-2 Section, GHQ officers until after the Chief of Staff, Lt. Gen. Hickey, GHQ had approved the order establishing CCRAK. Lt. Gen. Everest was furious because he had not been consulted prior to the time the order was issued, and more significantly, because G-2 officers pretended to him when they first talked to him about the subject that the order was not yet approved. The tactics adopted by officers of G-2 Section, GHQ, therefore, seemed to be to win command control over CIA and then to present a fait accompli to Air Force and Navy.

8. The basic order establishing CCRAK dated 28 November 1951 almost completely ignored the Seoul Agreement and threw out almost all of the points insisted upon by CIA in WASH 12391. The premise of our Washington position was that assets in Korea be turned over to CIA at an early date - obviously with an impending armistice in mind. The Washington position was changed in the implementing order to read "gradual transfer." (See Annex No. 7) The only Washington position retained in the order was that CIA Mission Korea would retain organizational integrity. Sensitive and long-range operations were not specifically excluded from the CCRAK Charter.

9. This order was announced without the concurrence and without the knowledge of [redacted] Gen. Weyland and was in serious disagreement with the basic position taken by CIA and by Lt. Gen. Everest. It is believed that it was done without the knowledge of Gen. Ridgway.

III. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ORDER ESTABLISHING CCRAK

A. Difference between CIA and G-2 Section, GHQ in Mission Appreciation

1. Throughout the negotiations CIA pledged its cooperation to the notion that theater commanders must be served during time of combat. However, OPC-OSO officers also realized that they were enjoined by National Intelligence Directives to collect information on many extremely important intelligence targets in North Korea, [redacted] (For instance, the Monozite Mines in North Korea were a target of urgent priority.)

There were no Washington Directives in this theater relieving the CIA Mission Korea from its responsibility for procuring high-level, strategic information, and the CIA Mission Korea was the only hope in the area from October 1951 on, which might warn of large-scale attacks.

2. While, on the other hand, the OPC Mission in Korea enjoyed equally good avenues of approach into North Korea

The rugged mountainous terrain that crosses [redacted] Northeastern Korea [redacted] offered an excellent opportunity for the establishment of a safe guerrilla base. The North Korean labor party was composed of many different factions drawn from several places of the Far West. The Party was still in the development stage known as the Father-land Front stage. Entrance into the NKLP seemed relatively easy and many North Korean boys were being recruited for training in the use of Soviet aircraft and their maintenance. The Army used by the Chinese Communists against the forces of the United Nations was very largely composed of men who formerly were members of the Chinese Nationalist Army. People of North Korea lost seventy percent of their rice, it was reported, to the NKLP. In other words, the entire situation was fluid from almost every point of view and the opportunity might exist for the creation by clandestine means of a deep political resistance movement against the Communists. These opportunities still exist.

3. At the same time, the CIA Mission Korea also bore a responsibility for supporting the Air Force, Army, and Navy engaged in combat in Korea. We believe that it is at this point where confusion exists concerning the mission of CIA during times of combat, for as soon as negotiations began concerning CCRAK, it became clear to CIA officers in this theater that the appreciation of Army negotiators of the mission, tradecraft, security devices, and potentialities of CIA was far different from the appreciation held by CIA officers. More precisely, Army negotiators felt the CIA's willingness to serve the Theater Commander meant that CIA should now become just another extension of the G-2 Section in Korea. They thought of the CIA Mission Korea in terms of a collection agency for tactical information and as a unit whose unconventional warfare program should be guerrillas used in close support of EUSAK.

4. It must be remembered that the CIA Mission Korea was not relieved of its national mission and, indeed, had made fast strides towards its accomplishment during the very few

months of its organizational existence. CCRAK, therefore, posed a great question for CIA in this theater: Did its participation in CCRAK throw to the ground its national mission?

5. It must be remembered that, later, the order establishing CCRAK limited its functions to those activities in direct support of armed forces in Korea. However, although CCRAK's mission was limited to those activities in direct support, there was no clarification of the question of how much effort the CIA Mission Korea should make in CCRAK and how much effort it should make in support of its national mission.

6. Here it must be frankly stated that CIA officers in this theater firmly believed that they could best render support to the Theater Commander by attempting to carry out its national missions rather than becoming a low-level tactical organization. And it must be stated in equally frank terms that CIA officers felt that Gen. Ridgway, Gen. Van Fleet, Gen. Everest, and Adm. Martin were of the same opinion; while, on the other hand, the officers of G-2 EUSAK and G-2 GHQ were of a different opinion. Both Gen. Ridgway and Gen. Van Fleet have said many times that they required high-level information concerning the intentions of the enemy and were content to accept tactical intelligence as provided by their G-2 sections.

B. Definition of CCRAK Responsibilities

1. Because of the vagueness concerning the length of time CCRAK might operate after combat cease, [] asked the G-2, GHQ for his attitude on that question. (See Annex No. 10) The reply given [] to this question we believe to be highly indicative of the attitude of G-2, GHQ. The entire reply is quoted in Annex No. 11, but here are its most salient points:

a. Armistice or no armistice, there is no peace in the Far East, nor will there be in the foreseeable future. The Red Threat...is a continuing one.

b. To meet this threat, FEC control...is essential.

c. CCRAK should remain unchanged until peace is assured in Korea. Cessation of hostilities is no guarantee that armed warfare will not be resumed.

d. Until all troops, CCF and UN, have withdrawn, CCRAK will remain.

2. A serious blunder, we feel, was made at this time by G-2, GHQ, in having the order establishing CCRAK

published before the Air Force had the opportunity to go over the final draft. In response to queries from Gen. Everest and Gen. Weyland on this subject, Lt. Gen. Doyle O. Hickey, Chief of Staff, replied that the Air Force's desires would receive thorough consideration prior to implementing the detailed operational and functional plan with CCRAK. Inasmuch as the Fifth Air Force had not been consulted prior to the order establishing CCRAK, Gen. Everest did not feel that the Army was acting in this case in good faith. (See Annex No. 9)

3. [redacted] a paper defining the responsibility and functions of CCRAK was sent from G-2, GHQ, to Korea. (See Annex No. 12) This paper continued the G-2 Section, GHQ attitude of thinking of CCRAK as a command organization over the CIA Mission Korea. Although the basic Charter of CCRAK had been published without including the provisions initialed in the Seoul Conference paper, and without any of the CIA points established in WASH-12391 except for unit integrity, this implementation draft order now attempted to do away with the only Washington provision left in the Charter - unit integrity. We recommend strongly that you study this paper thoroughly because it is the best statement we know of the attitude of G-2 Section officers concerning the way they believe covert and clandestine activities should be organized in times of combat. It is a position exemplified, it is said, by Gen. McClure and others of that school of thought. The principle upon which the paper rests is: Complete Command Control. In effect it does away with CIA and places CIA officers and operations completely under the control of G-2 officers. For instance, this paper would give Chief, CCRAK supervisory authority over the expenditure of funds allocated to units under his control. It would give Chief, CCRAK authority over all housekeeping and attendant duties as the situation may require. It would not permit the hiring of any indigenous person without the approval from G-2. It would give Chief, CCRAK, authority to conduct intelligence operations for related activities within Korea or originating in Korea and directed into contiguous areas.

4. Note well that this paper would elevate G-2 Section into a position where it could direct any organization to carry out the national missions of CIA, and it ignores the basic CCRAK order's limiting clause: CCRAK is in direct support of Armed Forces in Korea.

5. This paper was not published [redacted] and, so far, no implementation order exists [redacted] defining the duties of Chief, CCRAK. However, the basic attitude embodied in that paper still remains and has been expressed by the present Chief, CCRAK when he said that CCRAK does possess authority to carry out long-range missions beyond the Yalu and

into China. This stand is in flat contradiction to the CCRAK Charter.

6. [redacted] reported his attitude concerning the draft order. "It indicates a shocking desire for control." [redacted] was also told by the G-2 GHQ that he did not have knowledge of the implementation draft order. [redacted] at that time also reported to G-2 GHQ his feelings that CCRAK must remain within its Charter as a staff in direct support of armed forces in Korea, and that National Intelligence Directives should remain within CIA. (See Annex No. 13)

7. This implementation order also began a series of attempts by officers within G-2 GHQ to circumvent [redacted] by sending orders directly to CCRAK whose contents involved the CIA Mission Korea. That practice has continued until the date of this writing, 5 March 1952. When this circumvention is pointed out to these officers they admit their error, but persist in the practice.

8. The next move made by G-2 GHQ to define the duties of Chief, CCRAK involved a CE program for Korea which was embodied in a paper written by Col. Blakeney, Commanding Officer, FEC/LG. (See Annex No. 15) This draft again circumvented [redacted]. It included an attempt by G-2 GHQ to enter the field of controlled agents for deception purposes. It also entered the field of monitoring clandestine enemy communications. The reply to this paper (See Annex No. 15) was prepared by Col. Ives pointing out to Col. Blakeney that the CIA Mission Korea would carry forward controlled agent activities into enemy territory. After consultation with G-2, EUSAK, he reserved controlled agent operations in South Korea to the CIC. He reserved the monitoring of enemy communications in Korea to ASAPAC. No implementation order in this field was issued, but the attitude of G-2 officers remains and will be carried out in the field.

9. During a meeting of officers from all units within CCRAK on 4 February 1952, Col. Ives, Chief, CCRAK stated that CCRAK now had far-ranging plans beyond the Yalu, and that FEC/LD had been authorized to go deep by G-2 GHQ. Other officers from other units told Col. Ives that they felt incapable of carrying out that mission which, they felt, should be reserved for the CIA Mission Korea. Lt. Col. George Budway, USAF, Deputy for Air, CCRAK, told Col. Ives that CCRAK would be "going in way over its head," for CCRAK by Charter was limited to direct support of armed forces. CIA officers told Col. Ives that in their opinion CCRAK should remain within its Charter.

10. From the foregoing it should be clear that although CCRAK was established for direct support of armed

forces, it now is adopting a mission comparable to - if not the same as - CIA. G-2 officers have clearly indicated their desire to take over CIA and its mission.

11. In implementing CCRAK Charter, G-2 officers have displayed little concern over the security of American sensitive operations. For instance, G-2 EUSAK has asked Chief CCRAK to give him a list of all operational safehouses in the city of Seoul, including the names of all occupants, their duties, and operations that require them to occupy safehouses. G-2, EUSAK explains that this housing was commandeered by the Army in violation of its own regulations. It is believed that this is persiflage inasmuch as a state of semi-martial law exists in Seoul and no house can be occupied without Army approval. In a meeting with the Chief/CIA Mission Seoul Station Korea, an officer of CCRAK stated that after discussing this matter with Col. Van Natta, G-2 EUSAK, he was convinced that Col. Van Natta did not need to know that operational information, but merely wanted to know these operational facts. The effect of releasing that information to another American agency would be a severe security risk, and rather than conform, the CIA Mission Korea would have to protect its agents by moving them from Seoul.

12. Another unwarranted attempt to gain operational information that is not required by a non-operating agency occurred on 4 March 1952 when G-2 GHQ requested a weekly statement from the CIA Mission Korea concerning the number of agents infiltrated and exfiltrated, number of reports in and out, number of reports received from agent radio circuits. It was explained that G-2 GHQ desired this operational information for briefing purposes. Again the security risks involved in this unusual request are apparent, as well as the obvious attempt to gain further control and possible elimination of [redacted] monthly briefing of Ridgway. Direct access to and periodic briefing of commanding generals are essential if CIA accomplishments are to be known to those gentlemen, as witness Gen. Van Fleet's negative reply to the question: Had he ever received anything credited to CIA.

IV. PRESENT STATUS OF CCRAK

A. Organization of CCRAK

1. CCRAK is now headed by Col. Washington M. Ives, who was Deputy for Administration, G-2 GHQ. Col. Ives is a fine gentlemen with no intelligence training or operational background who states that he is in a very difficult position because he does not know the business. Although under severe pressure from Col. Blakeney and Col. Bratton in G-2 GHQ, Col. Ives has recognized that if the covert and clandestine missions were to be performed, they must be done under the CIA Mission

Korea officers. When given a difficult operational assignment, Col. Ives invariably has turned to the CIA Mission Korea officers for guidance. The reasons for this practice are obvious, but their time-consuming effects upon the CIA's activities have been great. That time could very well have been spent in getting on with the CIA Mission Korea Mission, and the effects of CCRAK have meant a duplication of efforts by senior officers in the CIA Mission Korea.

2. The Deputy, CCRAK is the Chief/CIA Mission Korea, who already has been under severe pressure accomplishing his own duties. Inasmuch as the desires of General Ridgway, General Van Fleet, General Everest, and Admiral Briscoe can only be met through long-range sensitive operations, the Chief/CIA Mission Korea must spend time within CCRAK and then go back to his own Mission where the work must be performed.

3. Chief, Seoul Station CIA Mission Korea has acted as Operations Officer for Chief, CCRAK and has reported many times that the only organization capable of providing what Senior Commanders desire is the CIA Mission Korea, and that invariably after long discussions with CCRAK, he must return to his own unit to plan and execute intelligence requirements.

4. [redacted] of the CIA Mission Korea, was assigned as the CE Officer to CCRAK, and is the third officer committed to CCRAK by the CIA Mission Korea.

5. Lt. Col. George M. Budway, USAF, was assigned by 5th Air Force to CCRAK as Deputy for Air. Col. Budway has stated many times that there was no reason for the existence of CCRAK in the first place, and that the G-2's authority to coordinate, which it possessed prior to CCRAK, was all that the field required. He has stated to Col. Ives his fears that CCRAK was attempting to expand its Charter and that it was draining resources from the CIA Mission Korea which more appropriately should be employed in the accomplishment of the CIA Mission. At present, Col. Budway is the only officer committed to CCRAK by the Air Force.

6. Staff Sections of CCRAK are broken down into S-2, S-3 Sections and a combined S-1 and S-4 Section. In a meeting of all of these Staff Sections during February 1952, it was agreed that representatives of operating units should meet once a week in order to discuss which unit could carry out any given requirement. It was clear to all present that the only way intelligent planning could be done was by those officers who were most familiar with operating indigenous personnel. This indicates the feelings of those officers who know the organization best concerning the way the covert and clandestine job should be

done, and indicates the fact that coordination - not control - is required.

B. Security Within CCRAK

1. It has been shown time and time again that persons who have not been trained in clandestine tradecraft cannot safely be entrusted with total information concerning CIA and its operations. Army Officers assigned to CCRAK have repeatedly violated basic tradecraft practices.

[REDACTED]

Also, at a cocktail party given by officers of FEC/LD, the names of operating organizations within CIA were openly announced by an Army officer present. Wounded guerrillas have been brought to CCRAK Headquarters, and a captured enemy agent was driven in a jeep through Seoul to that Headquarters. Koreans are driven in daylight in a truck with FEC/LD bumper markings to K-16 Airport where parachutes are placed upon them and where they are openly boarded upon a USAF aircraft. The association of CIA officers with the CCRAK organization can blow them for all time, and their usefulness to CIA in the future be seriously reduced. The security situation within CCRAK tends to make penetration of that organization a rather simple operation and CIA must appreciate that fact.

C. Command Channels

1. Command channels [REDACTED] to the CIA Mission Korea are openly circumvented, presumably in an effort to bring all of the CIA Mission Korea's operations under the command of G-2 officers.

2. The command channel from Chief, CCRAK, is by Charter directly to CinCFE. However, in actual practice command channel is from Chief, CCRAK to Col. Blakeney, Commanding Officer, FEC/LG, G-2 GHQ. This is one reason why General Ridgway has not known the true nature of the effect of his decision to place CIA in Korea under G-2, GHQ.

D. Morale Within The CIA Mission Korea

1. Almost all of the personnel within the CIA Mission Korea are volunteers who are highly motivated. They accepted assignment in Korea because they believed that the future of CIA could best be preserved by making a good record in a theater of combat. The effects of the attempt by G-2 officers to command them and their operations is not the least important result flowing from the institution of CCRAK. They cannot

understand why command was given to an outfit with tactical line-crossing operations which is incapable of doing the real job. They have been proud of the fact that General Van Fleet endorsed their approach when he said on 2 March 1952, "I am glad to see that you are concentrating on your long-range strategic mission and leaving tactical OB collection to the G-2. That type of information can best be obtained by continuous pressure along the front." In December 1951 Admiral Perry, Carrier Task Force 77, stated, "Of the seemingly hundreds of U. S. Intelligence operations in Korea, the CIA Mission Korea has consistently provided us the most reliable and timely information of any organization here." Lt. Gen. Everest, Commanding General, 5th Air Force, has written a letter of commendation for the CIA Mission Korea praising its contribution to his mission, and he has suggested that Far East Air Force do the same. In fact, General Everest has offered us his S. A. U. "bag and baggage," and has repeatedly urged that CIA stand on its own feet and perform the coordination function in Korea. At the same time, G-2 EUSAK, has publicly stated upon many occasions during the last month that the CIA Mission Korea work has been of little or no value to him. This anomaly is difficult for the CIA Mission Korea to understand. Perhaps a statement made by Col. Ives to Lt. Col. Budway in February 1952 sheds light. Col. Ives stated that G-2 EUSAK, Col. Van Natta, desired to control CCRAK and its organizations.

E. CCRAK's Mission as Defined by G-2, GHQ

1. G-2, GHQ officers are moving far afield from the original agreement initialed in Seoul on 22 October 1951. After initialing that agreement they caused to be published a Charter for CCRAK which established the principle of command control over the CIA Mission Korea, ignoring almost all of the basic points required in WASH 12391. Only the principle of unit integrity remained after that basic order, and subsequent events have repeatedly shown that G-2 officers will move beyond that last restriction.

2. Col. Ives, Chief, CCRAK has indicated that he has been privately authorized to direct operations outside of Korea.

3. In addition to the above, the G-2 GHQ has written that his domination over the CIA Mission Korea will continue until all foreign troops have been removed from Korea, and until the threat of war no longer exists.

V. RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Status

1. Continuation of the present situation of CIA within CCRAK can lead to serious ramifications in our relation with General Ridgway. It is now clear that officers within G-2, GHQ will not keep their word as pledged to CIA, nor does there seem an end to their appetites. Under present arrangements, CIA Representative, FECOM, will have to continue to bring to the attention of General Ridgway breaches of agreement by officers under his command. Our relations with General Ridgway have been fully cooperative on both sides and he has always displayed the desire to do the right thing. However, it is now clear that G-2 officers may well cause a rift.

2. Our present close association with officers of G-2, GHQ leads to the waste of many man-hours which could more profitably be spent upon CIA matters.

3. Acceptance of the present and continuing diversities of G-2 officers will lead to a loss of organizational and operational CIA integrity.

4. It now seems apparent that G-2 methods in Korea will be extended throughout the Far East Command.

5. Once given a foot in the door, G-2 officers have proven that they intend to take over the entire covert and clandestine program of the United States. Once having done so in combat they have indicated that they do not intend to relinquish that control until a state of absolute peace exists in the world.

6. Therefore, it is recommended that:

a. The CIA Mission Korea be withdrawn from CCRAK, placed on its own feet, and directed to continue the attack upon the enemy.

b. [] be removed from G-2, GHQ staff supervisory control and established upon a similar footing with the Department of State, keeping General Ridgway fully informed where appropriate.

[]
Senior CIA Representative
Far East Command